Leadership: Change,

Control and Achievement

Marcus Foster did not treat his plans for changing the Oakland public schools as ends in themselves. The three innovations were expected to produce two benefits: first, Foster anticipated an increase in the educational performance of Oakland’s students, and second, these same innovations would create a new organizational form for urban school systems. In developing his plans for change the new superintendent addressed himself to three of the most vigorously expressed criticisms of public bureaucracy. Critics who seized on the assumed insularity of bureaucracy were the immediate audience for Foster’s plans for community involvement and participation. A more restricted audience which faulted the hierarchical distribution of authority in formal organizations found Foster to be in sympathy with their position. Because he did share some of their outlook, the superintendent planned to decentralize power in the organization. The third innovation which Foster wanted for his organization was expected to demonstrate that public bureaucracies could become as efficient in the use of resources as many asserted was the case with private firms. Efficiency and rationality were the twin objectives of his attempts to develop and adopt the program budget.

Foster did not begin the introduction of change with the tentativeness of the novice. He moved quickly to give tangible meaning to his plan for community involvement when he gave the

community a voice in the selection of principals. This was elaborated through the creation of the Master Plan Citizens Committee. Moreover, Foster’s successful efforts to secure funds for the MPCC was clear evidence of the seriousness of his intentions with regard to participatory decision making in the Oakland schools. Foster, like many other advocates of participatory democracy, expected involvement to result in a more cooperative relationship between the organization and its public. Such cooperation, he believed, could also be converted into support for revenue measures which the school system needed. The emphasis given to community involvement also reflected the belief of education professionals that such involvement leads to improved educational performance by students. In view of Oakland’s difficulties in this latter area it is not surprising that the superintendent’s second innovation, decentralization, was also partially addressed to enhancing the community role. Community involvement received the greatest amount of Foster’s attention. Frequent public engagements and accessibility to various individuals and groups contributed to the success of this innovation. But from the standpoint of organizational leadership this was, perhaps, the easiest change to accomplish.

Foster’s strong belief in the merits of participation was quickly accommodated by a permissive environment for this type of change. It is also important to recognize that the superintendent did not require the resources of other members of his organization to make participation work. It was unnecessary because Foster was not directly changing the organization. Community involvement was directed outside and, initially, it did not affect the normal routines of the system’s staff. Where Foster did seek help, as with securing foundation support for the MPCC, he knew what kind he needed. Moreover he knew where such aid was likely to be available and, once it was given, how it was to be employed. Again, however, the superintendent controlled the necessary resources to make this innovation a success.

Nor was community involvement the radical change that some may have expected. Foster’s plan was an elaboration of the traditional community role in local education. It was innovative, however, because he expanded the kinds of roles which citizens might fill, and provided a systematic means for exchanging information and views between the school system and a public

the meaning which Foster gave to community involvement that represented a significant change. The creation of the MPCC was his crucial first step toward achieving an ecological relationship between the public bureaucracy he led and its social and political environment. Perhaps because of the ease with which the system had adapted to community participation Foster did not expect serious problems with the move toward decentralization. However, decentralization was a different order of change. With this innovation the superintendent began to alter his organization directly. Much of the rationale for this innovation stressed the degree to which it would contribute to the full development of meaningful community involvement.

But Foster also insisted that decentralization would make the preparation of the program budget an easier task. This view stemmed from a belief that decentralized goals and objectives, developed by community residents and school staff, would logically become part of the program structure in the new approach to budgeting. The superintendent characterized this innovation as "empowering the local school site," meaning that he wanted those most closely connected with the educational problems in each region to develop individualized plans. But it is one thing for a group of individuals to develop goals and objectives, and something completely different for the group to carry them out. The former requires little power to execute, but the latter rests on the possession of resources and the ability to use them.

The plan to decentralize the Oakland public schools foundered on two issues. One of these, which Foster acknowledged, was the need to introduce this change within existing revenue constraints. The other, which was unexpected, was the necessity of reducing someone’s power in order to redistribute it to the regions. Both of these issues were contained in the dispute between the regionals and the director of psychological services. The director was unwilling to give up his power in the organization. And he possessed sufficient strength to resist the effort by the regionals. If Foster had sided with the regionals he would have had to exercise precisely that kind of unilateral action which decentralization was said to make unnecessary. Since there was little slack in organizational resources, the superintendent could do little to make the regionals’ positions more credible.

Foster's plan was to accept the form od decentralization without the substance, in part because he placed a high value on organizational stability. Moving quickly to give the regionals power would, in addition, have forced him to violate one of his own beliefs about leadership. That is, he would not resort to the use of his executive power to order the decentralization because it would have damaged the image of cooperative leadership which he was trying to create. In any event Foster accepted the fact that for a time effective decision making for the schools would continue to be centralized. He continued to believe, however, that when the revenue situation eased decentralization could be made an effective part of the organization.

Decentralization did produce a benefit for the schools and the superintendent. And, paradoxically, it was partially a result of minimizing disruption. The regional plan effectively preempted an area of potentially serious conflict. Due to the racial makeup of the student body and school enrollments, questions of de facto segregation might have been expected in Oakland. But the carefully devised plan for achieving socioeconomic and racial balance in the newly created attendance areas reduced the likelihood of public controversy on this issue. As with community involvement, a good part of this achievement resulted from Foster’s ability to control the development of the regional plan. The superintendent had very clearly specified what he wanted, and getting it depended little on the resources of others in the organization.

The third of Foster’s innovations, the program budget, was expected to rationalize decision making. Based upon the goals and objectives that were expected to come from decentralization, the cabinet would be in a position to make the "best" decision in allocating resources to various organizational tasks. This would have produced a twofold benefit. Budgetary decisions would become more objective in the sense that the superintendent and his cabinet would presumably know if a particular decision was consistent with the agreed-upon objectives and the schedule of priorities. And the program structure of the new budget document would be much more understandable for the Board of Education and public during budget hearings.

This attempted innovation encountered troubles from the start. New computer facilities were required, putting added strain on an already limited finanacial situation. Technical assistance from the state was not forthcoming. Program accounts for PPBS were not compatible with state accounting requirements based upon a line-item budget and the conversion process was time-consuming and costly. Assuming that these difficulties could have been resolved (a heroic assumption at best), the program budget posed a unique problem. Here was an innovation for which Foster could draw on no prior experience. There were no instances of success with full PPBS to which the superintendent and his staff could look for guidance. Foster’s commitment to this change was based on his belief that it could be accomplished. Although they acknowledged a need for technical aid, neither Foster nor his key staff knew what kind to seek or where it might be found. The superintendent’s belief that the program budget could be developed overwhelmed any impulse by the members of his cabinet to raise questions. The more questions were not asked, the more the superintendent’s commitment became a group phenomenon, further diminishing the likelihood of questions.

A decisionmaking style, which encouraged healthy skepticism, might have increased the chances for a careful examination of the suitability of PPBS for the Oakland schools. A search for answers to the hard intellectual and technical questions inherent in the concept of a program budget might have given Foster pause. Ironically, the problems with the program budget were attributable to the fact that Foster did control the innovation effort. It was the power of his own belief which dominated that of other members of the cabinet. And it was his control of the cabinet which effectively inhibited an examination of this innovation.

Still, the effort was not a complete failure. The Oakland schools did begin to look more carefully at their budgetary practices. The school administrators had taken the first tentative steps toward a more systematic appraisal of education and the kinds of activities that offered some prospect for improving student performance.

After three years of trying to change the Oakland public schools Marcus Foster was forced to admit that his hopes had not been completely realized. True, he could take credit for improved relations between his organization and the community. But the superintendent took little comfort in this accomplishment. Indeed, Foster voiced his disappointment over the lack of progress that time the associate superinteildents were still complaining about their lack of sufficient staff. The head of Planning, Research and Evaluation attempted to argue that he could save the district money if only he had more people. Dr. Foster unhesitatingly told him. "When you’re failing it is difficult to persuade critics that you need more staff." For Foster it simply was not enough to have created a supportive constituency.

There was also some bitterness. In a speech before the American Association of School Administrators, the superintendent of schools charged:

[B}lacks become superintendents only in cities like mine where the percentage of non-whites has reached 78 percent. Black educators don’t get called into "cushy" jobs, schools, either. We go through a coronary alley at all those tough high schools and they tell us, "Here it is baby, make it fly!" Then when you can’t make it, they say, "hold you those niggers can’t do it!"i

This was not the first time that he expressed this sentiment, but it was the only time he had done so publicly. Still, Foster was expressing a view which other black administrators shared with him. Like him, these individuals had private resentments about the public’s expectations of rapid solutions to problems of long standing. Although Oakland showed little visible response to Dr. Foster’s remarks, he sent a more moderate letter on the school system and his tenure to the Oakland Tribune two weeks later. He emphasized the achievements of the school system under his leadership. Despite the acknowledged lack of definitive success with all of his changes, the superintendent derived satisfaction from setting them in motion.2 Nonetheless, Foster knew that he had made promises to the Board of Education and to the public. His audiences were a bit restive over the seeming lack of improvement in the students’ academic performance. The gains in reading scores which the school staff reported from time to time were unsatisfactory when measured against the expectations which the could gain some satisfaction. His critics were less hostile than he might have expected them to be. And they were not expressing opposition to what he was trying to do. That is, organizational changes were evaluated independently of student achievement. This comes as no real surprise when we consider that most of the innovations were taking place inside the organization. There was little for the public to see. But there were some things which were readily apparent.

1. Oakland Tribune, 21 March 1973, p. f-13; see also the San Francisco Chronicle, 21 March 1973, p. 4. The figure of 78 percent used by Foster refers to the student population, not the city’s total.

2. James Payne employs the idea of "program incentive" in an effort to explain this satisfaction from working on one’s policies. See the discussion in James L. Payne, Incentive Theory and Political Process (Lexington, Mass.:

D. C. Heath, 1972), p. 84.

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Student vandalism had not decreased and it was easy for citizens to see the evidence in the broken windows of school buildings. Violence in the school district seemed to be on the rise. The combination of violence, a new problem, and limited academic improvement, a persistent old problem, forced Foster to give less time to working on his innovations than he might have wished. But he knew that this particular combination of problems was important to his organizational public. Moreover, this set of problems posed a potential threat to the ability of the schools to carry out their most important routine, classroom teaching.

Foster, however, continued to enjoy strong community support. Indeed, despite the emergence of a new and serious problem, and within a few months of his strongly worded letter to the Oakland Tribune, the Board of Education offered, and Foster accepted, a new four-year contract which included a raise in salary. Neither of these actions provoked a public outcry. Nor did the limited success of Foster’s attempts at innovation diminish his attractiveness to others in the educational profession. That is to say, Foster’s decision to stay in Oakland was not prompted by a lack of alternatives. Another superintendent’s post and a senior appointment at a nearby university had been offered shortly before he accepted Oakland’s new contract.

Disappointment over the limited progress toward his goals might have led to some thoughts of resignation. But Foster refused to admit defeat. And in his judgment, resigning, even to take another position, would be just that. Perhaps there was an additional consideration. By staying in Oakland Dr. Foster might have believed it would be possible to prove the anonymous "they" referred to in his letter to the Tribune to be wrong about the capabilities of black administrators. And finally there were elements of personal and professional pride involved. Foster was deeply committed to urban education it was both his carreer and

his profession. Leaving an unfinished task for a successor was, in his view, unprofessional conduct. In personal terms, Foster’s self-esteem might have received a blow if a replacement were to achieve success where Foster had not. In any event, Foster did not leave Oakland and he did not abandon his commitment to change in the Oakland public schools. Together with his key staff, the superintendent continued to assure the Board of Education and the public that they were hard at work making the system "fly."

During his three years in Oakland, Superintendent Foster sought to combine two, perhaps contradictory, conceptions of the political executive’s responsibilities. On the one hand. he viewed himself as his organization’s "change-agent." His actions with regard to the start of innovations appear to be consistent with Selznick’s ideas about redefining organizational purpose and character.3 In addition, Foster, as Herbert Simon has noted, had to be the innovator, who has a special duty to attend to "creative" problem solving for the organization.4 By filling this role, the executive becomes a stimulus for others within the organization to release their own creative energies. Such formulations of the leadership role seem to imply that "whatever the source of the leader’s ideas, he cannot inspire his people unless he expresses . . goals and aims which in some sense they want."5 While these ideas do not fully embrace the core of the "human relations" approach to management, they do imply a more cooperative style of leadership than is normally associated with the classic hierarchical distribution of authority in formal organizations.

No one seriously questioned the political executive’s responsibility to introduce innovations, or to make the critical decisions their adoption would require. Because of his own belief that the executive as "change-agent" should not be involved in "operations," however, Foster delegated substantial responsibilities for implementation to the associate superintendents. In other words, routine duty assignments to his key subordinates. In some cases, perhaps, the issue of delegation might not deserve much attention, but when an organization is being moved toward new ways of task performance and definition, delegation itself becomes a critical decision. If the innovations had been treated as discrete entities, the assignments of specific responsibilities to the individual associate superintendents would not have put implementation at risk. But community involvement, decentralization and the program budget were not independent in Foster’s thinking. He consistently stressed his belief that these changes constituted a single, comprehensive policy for the management of big-city school systems. The three programs were presented as a unit for board consideration. The board gave its approval because Foster was persuasive, not because the interdependencies among the components were fully explained.

3. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), chapter 2.

4. Herbert A. Simon, "The Decision Maker as Innovator" in Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior, ed. Sidney Mallick and Edward Van Ness (Englewood Clifs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 66-69.

5. David C. McClelland, "The Two Faces of Power," Journal of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (1970): 38.

Another weakness revealed by the Oakland experience is the difficulty imposed upon efforts to change by organizational poverty. The constraints on innovation within the schools were most severe in the areas of decentralization and PPBS. It is worth recalling in this connection that Foster’s success with community involvement was significantly aided by the external foundation support which he was able to secure for the Master Plan Citizens Committee. No such assistance was available for either of the additional programs. Thus it would seem that resource deficiencies often exacerbate the normal difficulties which are expected to accompany attempts at organizational change. For public bureaucracies, dependent upon tax levies for their revenues, there does not appear to be any immediate solution to the dilemma. Foster believed that organizational change was possible within the resource constraints which existed when he took over as the head of the school system. In addition, he expected that those changes would help to convert public dissatisfaction, as shown by the history of failure on tax and bond issues, into support for his claims for additional revenues. We have seen, however, that the campaign for a tax increase under his administration also met with defeat. Foster, too, learned that there were limits to environmental permissiveness.

Few political executives consider themselves to be "theorists" of organizations. Too often they view this expression as implying "leisurely" reflections and study. Like Foster these individuals believe they have no time for such activities. What is usually meant by those who want organizational leaders to be theorists is little more than what William F. Whyte had in mind in suggesting that the executive can act more effectively if he recognizes the organization models he carries around in his head and tests them against the realities of experience.6

The management policy which Foster sought to introduce was broad in scope, embracing not merely the organization, but a substantial part of the external political environment as well. The innovations implied a totally new relationship between organizations and their public. And it was this unique conception, of transforming a public organization into an integral part of the citizens’ lives, which Foster had been unable to make clear. Yet this was the central idea in his references to the schools as "community institutions." Community involvement and decentralization were means to that end. These changes would provide a way for the development of systematic exchanges between the organization and the environment which would be a tacit statement of their interdependence. More important, from Foster’s point of view, was his expectation that once recognized, interdependence would turn into an exchange of resources leading to the improved academic performance of students which he had promised.

As George Gallup reminded us earlier, the public tends not to judge its political executives too harshly when their performances don’t quite match their promises. Still, it was the ambition and vision of his proposals for change which had made Dr. Foster an attractive candidate for the vacant post. It did not matter that the full scope of Foster’s vision for the future of urban education was not fully understood by Oakland’s citizens. What the public understood very well was Marcus Foster’s dedication to his profession and his commitment to changing public education for the better. Oakland had a superintendent who was energetic and capable of stimulating support for a public bureaucracy on the basis of his own persuasive idealism. Foster was able to inspire his staff and his public to believe that grand objectives could be realized. He was able to convince these audiences that reach must always exceed the ability to grasp. This is a difficult legacy to assess, for it is not entirely tangible. But it is that special quality by which we differentiate successful leaders and which reconciles us to an awareness of our own limitations.

6. William F. Whyte, "Models for Building and Changing Organizations," Human Organization 26, nos. 1 & 2 (Summer 1967): 22.

Epilogue

On 6 November 1973, marcus A. Foster, the superintendent of schools in Oakland, California, was assassinated. His deputy, Robert Blackburn, was critically wounded, but he recovered.

School board members reacted strongly:

"It’s like when Kennedy was assassinated.

"This is the greatest loss the City of Oakland has ever known . .

"[He gave] so much leadership, so much warmth, so much charisma he was just like a Pied Piper. People just came to him."

(Quoted in the Oakland Tribune, 7 November 1973)

An urban guerilla group calling itself the "Symbionese Liberation Army" claimed credit for the shooting, which occurred as Foster and Blackburn were leaving the weekly meeting of Oakland’s Board of Education. The SLA sent a letter to a local radio station stating that they had "executed" Foster because he had supported a controversial student identification program.

This political assassination of an educator whose mission was not political tragically ended Marcus A.(Albert) Foster’s life, and with it his experiment in open leadership and organizational innovation.